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Introduction 
 
A well- functioning, integrated radar 
system is too important and specific to be 
considered simply one of the subordinate 
elements of the C41SR system. 
Undoubtedly, it belongs to the major 
components of the air defence systems, both 
in our days and in the times of its early-day 
appearance. Radars became the most 
important devices of air reconnaissance 
during WW2. At those times, however, they 
constituted a part of different observation 
and reporting services. 
Their importance became obvious from 
their very first use. They managed to 
alleviate the drawbacks of the traditional 
reconnaissance means (eyes, ears, 
binoculars, listening devices) significantly. 
They possessed much better qualities, 
although not without problems, for target 
detection that did not depend on the season, 
time of the day and the flight altitude, for the 
timely access of information for the fighter 
control, as well as for the air defence missile 
firing. 
The development of radars, their 
production, and their use in battles wasn’t 
limited only to superpowers, and definitely 
not only to the British system, highly 
advertised both in literature and films. 
Besides German, American and Russian 
locator technology, „smaller” states were 
also able to show results. The Hungarian 
Royal Army was a good example during 
WW2. 
The Hungarian Army entered WW2 with 
serious deficiencies. There were two basic 
reasons for that. On the one hand, the 
decisions of the Trianon Peace Agreement, 
signed after the lost Great War, caused about 
10-15 years of impediment in the 
development of the armament, on the other 
hand, the economic position of the country 
could not allow the appearance of a modern 
army. It is an exaggeration to say that the 
country had to fight its battles on the 
technical level of the previous wars. But it 
was obvious that it struggled with serious 
lack of equipment. These factors soon came 
into light during military maneuvers. In our 
article we are going to describe problems 
arising in the reconnaissance of enemy 
aircraft and in their military solutions. 
 
The time between the two World Wars 
in Hungary 
 
The Trianon agreement did not prohibit 
the formation of the observation and report 
system for Hungary, only the active military 
forces connected with it, as well as the use 
of air defence artillery and air force. In 
1920, the Hungarian commanding staff had 
already started dealing with the question of 
air defence, as well as with that of 
reconnaissance and warning. 
The country was divided into seven 
„Royal military districts” and district 
commands (1. Budapest, 2. Székesfehérvér, 
3. Szombathely, 4. Kaposvár and after the 
end of the Serbian occupation, Pécs, 5. 
Szeged, 6. Debrecen, 7. Miskolc) The Air 
Defence district was established in the same 
areas in 1922 and later, in 1924, the seven 
Air defence areas appeared (I-VII) 
The main rules of the observation and 
reporting services were established as 
follows: 
• Gap-free, many-lined battle 
formation 
• „Coverage” of the country’s entire 
territory 
•  Combination and deployment of the 
mobile and immobile sentinels according to 
their tasks 
• Necessary grouping of the forces and 
equipment to strengthen the effectiveness of  
air force and air defence 
• Conditions and readiness proper for 
the military, not depending on the time of 
the year or day 
• Timeliness, both in reconnaissance 
and information, precision (place of service, 
number of items, flight direction, altitude, 
activities) 
• Organisation of unified, centralised 
leadership, based on integrated organisation 
and possibilities 
• Based on the district and the setting, 
from the proper level, information and alarm 
of the population and the military 
organisations 
• Cooperation between the military 
units with similar functions, as well as with 
the civilian defence forces. 
 
The Hungarian radar system in WW2 
 
After Hungary joined the war in 1941 it 
soon became evident that the observation 
and reporting services didn’t meet the 
requirements. On March 31, 1942 a reduced 
air defence readiness was ordered in the 
country, because it was observed that the 
front line moved from the borders and 
Soviet air attacks were not expected. It 
didn’t prove to be the right decision, since 
there was an air attack against the country 
on the 4th and later on the 9th of September. 
In the case of the first one, due to the 
reduced readiness, the air defence system 
proved unreliable. It was clear that the 
expected activities and the defence against 
them needed a new device: the RADAR. 
The Hungarian observation and report 
system was fully established by the middle 
of 1943. All air defence centres of the 15th 
Air Defence Area were operational. In 1944 
the exchange of information between all 
centres and their subunits was automatic. 
Their staff was comprised of 550 
observation and reporting sentries (some of 
them existed only on „paper” or with 
deficiency of special and signal equipment.) 
There was a mobile signal division on 
readiness with 32 signal sentries, basically 
for supplement of immobile sentries. 
By the beginning of 1940’s the 
completion of air defence tasks became 
more and more difficult. Due to this fact the 
effectiveness of the observation and report 
system, established earlier, became reduced. 
There was a need to get the information as 
precisely and early as possible. 
  To make the reconnaissance system 
more effective and to keep its operability 
was practically impossible without a newer, 
more modern device. The modern air 
defence practically „demanded„ the radio 
wireless location system. To perform the   
tasks well it was necessary to introduce 
them to the domestic air defence and its 
units. The classic problem areas of air 
defence came into light again, such as the 
question of early reconnaissance provision, 
the warning system, the continuous, 
minimally late information, the activation of 
forces and equipment, their timely 
deployment, the optimal division of 
resources for a successful battle. 
By this time radiolocation and radars had 
a significant past, since Heinrich Hertz 
proved in 1886 that electromagnetic waves 
reflect from electrically conducted materials. 
The research and experiments conducted 
by the Germans intensified from 1935.  The 
problems of radiolocation and hence the 
establishment of the „radar” was in the 
highlight of interest among researchers. In 
1937 the „Gema” factory manufactured the 
FREYA device with its range of 35-40 
kilometres. From 1938 the „Telefunken” 
company started experiments with 
WÜRZBURG radar family and later they 
started their production. 
In Hungary experiments went on from 
the 30’s. In the labs of the Tungsram dr. Bay 
Zoltán (1900-1992) (3. Dr. Bay Zoltán was 
one of the prominent members of the 
Hungarian science.  Before the age of 30, he 
became a teacher of theoretical physics in 
Germany. In the University of Szeged he 
worked as a professor of theoretical physics 
until 1936 when he was invited to be the 
leader of the Tungsram laboratory. After the 
World War he became even more famous in 
the international scientific life with his 
experiments, such as the measurement of 
distance between the earth and the moon by 
microwave technology, etc.) 
There was no production of independent 
locator yet, so Hungary needed German 
import and support. 
For effective air defence Germany 
manufactured locators for four different 
types of tasks, for the air attack warnings, 
for the fire of the air defence artillery, for 
fighters fire and as equipment for aircraft 
(night fighters). We were interested in the 
whole spectrum of the system, because a 
unified system of domestic air defence could 
not function with the lack of any elements. It 
was probable that the expected activities- the 
worsening threat of air attacks against 
Hungary- would increase the importance of 
the night time fighter activities and the 
necessity of the effectiveness of the air 
defence artillery. It was also connected with 
this problem that the population would be 
alarmed and informed at the right time. 
The Hungarian Royal Military Institute 
wanted to introduce domestic production 
and design. In the summer of 1942 the 
institute proposed to start the experiments. 
Naturally, the institute didn’t refrain from 
foreign procurements, but they were 
considered supplementary until self-supply 
was established. In September the director 
of the institute reported to the Chief of Staff 
and the Minister of Defence. He 
recommended domestic production, 
independently from Germany. The Minister 
of Defence, following his personal 
discussion with Dr. Bay, asked him to work 
out the theory of radar technology for the 
Hungarian army and to perform the basic 
experiments. So the military leadership 
accepted the proposals and they provided 
150000 pengő (Hungarian currency of that 
time) for the project. This money was 
distributed among the members of the team 
which consisted of eight engineers, a 
physics teacher and about ten technicians, 
led by Dr. Bay. So there were enough 
finances for the Hungarian far- distance 
reconnaissance locator program. (It was 
based on FREYA type, its design, 
production and its name was first VIKTOR, 
then SAS. ) The manufacturing of the radar 
soon started. The production of four pieces 
was planned and the Ministry of Defence 
provided 400 000 pengős. Genius professor 
Bay and his team did an excellent job. 
Though they had to work with triode 
transmitting valves- they were familiar with 
the magnetron and klystron theory- but there 
was not enough time and money for the 
domestic production. Even with these 
obstacles they managed to produce excellent 
devices. The practical work was performed 
by dr. Istvánffy Edvin, the director of 
STANDARD and his team. 
In December 1942, with the leadership 
of Major General Hellebronth Vilmos, a 
group of Hungarian specialists travelled to 
Germany to study locators. The Chief of the 
Air Force reported the following after his 
discussions with General Milch: 
There were two basic types mentioned 
which were necessary to deploy: 
Search locator „FREYA” 
(reconnaissance range 120-300 kms ) 
   Air defence fire delivery locator „ little 
WÜRZBURG„ or „WÜRZBURG-   
DORA„ (working range about 30 kms) 
   Fighter detection locator „the big 
WÜRZBURG„ or „WÜRRBURG- RIESE„ 
(reconnaissance range 40-75kms) 
   Fighter instrument „LICHTENSTEIN„ 
(recce range about 3 kms) 
 
  General Hellebronth, besides 
immediate Hungarian needs (1 piece of 
FREYA, 2 pieces WÜRZBURG – RIESE 
and 4 pieces of WÜRZBURG- DORA) 
announced our further requests, which were 
4 pieces of FREYA, 8 pieces of 
WÜRZBURG-RIESE and 30 pieces 
WÜRZBURG-DORA, together with the 
possibility to participate in the production of 
locators and their parts. Mainly, the 
Hungarian industry would be capable to 
produce transmission valves and electric 
parts. 
With the leadership of Colonel Dr. Jáky 
József, there was a a two-day visit at the „ 
Luftwaffen – befelfa- haber – Mitte „ firm. 
His report was not too optimistic. His task 
was to study the German radio measuring 
system, its production, and also to choose 
the necessary types for us, and he gave a 
more detailed description of the examined 
locators. The Colonel mentioned in his 
report that the answers he got to his 
questions were often evasive or exaggerated 
or too general. As it turned out later, the 
parameters of the devices were quite 
different from those that the Germans gave. 
More or less, they gave the data found in 
table number 1. 
These numbers were corrected later. The 
other task of Jáky and his group, besides 
requesting equipment from General 
Hellenbronth, was to ask for equipment for 
domestic training. They were established 
earlier as 2 pieces of search, 2 pieces of air 
defence fire delivery and 8-10 pieces fighter 
detection locators. 
It was obvious that the Hungarian 
requests seemed exaggerated for the 
Germans who needed all their locators due 
to the intensifying allied bombings, but if we 
wanted to obtain an effective recce system, 
we really needed to get serious quantity of 
those. 
By the beginning of 1943 the 
Reichslufwehr Ministry accepted an order 
for 1 search, 2 fighter detection and 4 fire 
delivery locators. Naturally it did not satisfy 
the needs of the Hungarian Command and 
the needs of other specialists. So a decision 
was made that an independent design and 
production should be introduced. The work 
of the Bay team was considered very 
successful, especially with the search and 
distance recce locators. The development of 
the other three types was also necessary. So 
they decided to strengthen this area as well. 
On the 5th of May, 1943 the Minister of 
Defence tasked Dr. Jáky to lead the 
establishment and the production of the 
Hungarian locator. He was subordinated 
directly to the Deputy Minister of Defence. 
He was also tasked with involvement of the 
country’s radio industry and electric 
engineering in the task. The Bay group’s 
deadline of experiments and development 
was the end of 1943 and the mass 
production was to start in the following year. 
He got a definite task to involve, if 
necessary, other industries, such as the 
heavy industry and the precision mechanics 
industry in his work, following agreements 
with the MoD. He was also responsible for 
the development, establishment of the signal 
network of the locator system, as well as 
supervision and coordination of electronics 
that remained from the German import. He 
was also responsible for the supervision of 
the project’s finances. His tasks and 
authority was widespread, but the 
complexity and the importance of the task 
required it. This choice of the person for that 
task proved to be perfect. Choosing Jáky 
provided an excellent organiser, a leader 
who had independent concepts, great 
knowledge for the development of the 
Hungarian locator system. 
The Bay group prepared the plans for the 
Hungarian FREYA and its production 
started in the same year. Experiments with 
locators for air defence artillery and fighters 
continued.  It was necessary since as it 
turned out, we couldn’t expect any supplies 
from abroad. 
On the 12th of February the German air 
defence attaché in Budapest informed the 
5th division of the MoD that by April 3 the 
Germans will deliver 3 air defence artillery 
locators, and by May one search and 2 
fighter detection locators for the Hungarian 
army. There was also an agreement about 
the training of the necessary staff. In the 1st 
phase the acquired or manufactured locators 
were to be used as follows: 
Budapest would get 4 FREYAs, Balaton 
3, Miskolc 3 Győr 3 , Lispe 1, Szolnok 3 
pieces. 
For night time fighter missions 5 fighter 
cells which need 5 FREYAs and 10 
WÜRZBURG-FRIESEs 
For air defence batteries are 45 
WÜRZBURG-DORAs. 
In the course of the following 
developments the entire territory of the 
country was to be covered with 27-30 
FREYAs and they would also provide recce 
across the borders as well as deployment of 
further 16 fighter cells ( with 1 FREYA and 
2 WÜRZBURG-Rs per cell). For the 
expected air defence batteries further 20 
WÜTZBURG-Ds were planned. 
In May the Germans gave the 
Hungarians 3 WÜRZBURG-Ds for the air 
defence artillery and further 2 in November.  
The system of locator qualification was 
prepared, and it was proposed to start the 
team trial of the three devices that arrived in 
the spring at the air defence district in 
Budapest. 
The STANDARD Company had already 
mentioned to the MoD that with their 
existing capacity they would not be able to 
to manufacture the necessary devices by 
1944/1945. The order of the MoD provided 
6 million pengos for 1944 and 10 million for 
1945. There was a need for a new factory 
block and they asked for a loan of about 4 
million pengos from the defence cabinet. 
The factory was planned to be built in the 
surroundings of Budapest or some other big 
industrial city. As a necessity for the 
production, about a thousand workers were 
hired. The 17/B department of the MoD, 
following the discussions with Colonel Dr. 
Jaky in November decided to provide the 
hall of the bus garage in Kelenfold, together 
with 2 million pengos as a loan. The 
deadline of the establishment was the middle 
of 1944. The MoD accepted the proposal to 
pay the loan in parts until the end of 1945. 
They introduced the present state of the 
production and the expected outcome. 
In May and in the beginning of June 
Colonel Jaky reported to the Commanding 
Staff about the work he had done in his field 
of responsibility. The group led by Dr. Bay 
showed serious results both in preparation in 
manufacturing and in experimenting. On the 
one hand, with the construction their 
production was based on  well- known ideas, 
on the other hand, their production 
introduced their own independent 
procedures that were based on their  
experiments, which caught the attention of 
the Germans, too. So, for example  the 
reconnaissance range of the SAS was longer 
than that of the FREYA. On the roof of the 
building of the Egyesult Izzo they created a 
new research laboratory and they managed 
to achieve significant results in the 
development of cathode ray valves. The 
productions of both the transmission and 
reception valves were at a stage of starting 
their mass production. The productions of 
the Hungarian designed locators were quick. 
The „general arraignment” drawing of the 
BORBALA artillery locator was ready. 
Colonel Jaky tasked the GANZ and the 
GAMMA with the mechanical construction. 
He thought it possible that the Hungarian 
industry would be able to produce one piece 
for the beginning of the next year. The work 
on the fighter guidance locator BAGOLY 
was also going well. The BAGOLY and the 
BORBALA were different only in their 
mechanical build-up, their electric set-up 
was almost the same. The biggest difference 
was in the size of the parabola mirror. Jaky 
also tasked other Hungarian firms with 
mechanical work of the fighter guidance 
locator. This task was given to the WAGON 
and GEPGYAR in Gyor and the MAVAG. 
In his opinion the experimental production 
could have started in August- September.  
Out of the 4 search, distance recce locators 
that were ordered at the end of 1942 1 piece 
was produced by the 1st of July. It was 
considered an experimental one and they 
wanted to modify the 3 devices during the 
undergoing production based on their 
findings. The SAS was capable for 60 kms 
of recce distance, but Jaky thought that the 
distance could be extended to 100 kms and 
even further. As it turned out later,  his 
prognosis was correct. He expected the next 
device to be ready by September and the 4th 
one by the end of the year. 
The Gneral Staff insisted to start the 
design work on the Hungarian radar TURUL 
to be fitted into fighters.  It was done in the 
PHILIPS factory, but mainly only in theory. 
In the report it was also mentioned that if 
they get the necessary support, mainly for  
factory capacities, then the mass production 
could be started in the second half of the 
year. It is true that Colonel Jaky also 
emphasized that the Hungarian factories, not 
only the STANDARD but also the industrial 
units producing mechanical and electric 
elements, needed to be developed. He 
considered that very important because in 
his opinion the Germans established the 
prices of locators as unrealistically high. 
  Eventually he informed the General 
Staff about the possibilities of the Hungarian 
production (in case his suggestions were 
accepted) about the expected and necessary 
German delivery, as well as the expenses in 
connection with the locators in the following 
2 and half years. 
The expected expenses were very high, 
though. For 1943 it meant about 13 and half 
million pengos with all equipment, supplies, 
with the locator premises, and by 1944 72 
million, by 1945 57 million pengos. 
Unfortunately, in spite of the existence of 
the designs and the intentions for the 
production there were no finances and 
production capacity. And as it soon turned 
out there was no sufficient time, either. 
By August Col. Jaky prepared the 
network for instalment of the search and 
artillery locators for the entire territory of 
the country, which he coordinated with the 
Commander of the Air Defence and he 
presented the plan to the General Staff. In 
his opinion it was necessary to establish a 
recce and an artillery system in the country. 
As a first step he proposed to establish 8 
SAS and FREYAs. He recommended 
installing the search locators in pairs, since a 
device of this type was able to search in 225 
degree radius. So they would be capable to 
do circular recce from all positions, in the 
directions of danger even overfolding could 
be provided. The establishment of a position 
was quite expensive, it cost about 1 and a 
half million pengos. In perspective he 
planned to establish a system that would 
provide extension of the radio location field 
over 100 kms, out of the borders of the 
country. Besides the search devices he 
recommended to deploy 2-2 pieces of 
BAGOLY and WURZBURG-Rs because 
from technical point they did not cost extra ( 
10 000 pengos ). He also planned the first 
phase of the deployment of the artillery fire 
delivery locators. He recommended 
deploying 4 locator bases for the Budapest 
air defence fire system, 2 for Gyor, 2 to 
Veszprem, 2 to Szolnok, 2 to Miskolc and 2 
to Lipse. He also worked out the 
organisation of the night time fighter 
guidance system. He needed further 18 
plants. For the effective reconnaissance, fire 
delivery and fighter location he needed 40 
air defence radio measuring (LRB ) devices. 
In September 1943 the second modified 
version of the SAS locator was ready at 
STANDARD. On the 2nd of November 
Jaky reported to the General Staff that there 
were 2 Hungarian- produced search locators 
available. One of them was deployed at 
Janos Mountain. The locator was 
experimental, further devices would be 
modified on its basis. It was also used for 
training purposes at home. The place of 
deployment was not a proper one, so Jaky 
recommended Sari to be the next place. 
From there SAS was capable to lead the 3 
WURZBURG-Ds of the fire systems in 
Budapest. The Sari plant was ready by 
December and started its work on the 20th. 
The second domestically produced locator 
was designed for night time fighter 
detection. There was an argument about 
where to deploy the device. They 
recommended Csorvanyos, then Felsoerdo, 
but the General Staff did not support these 
locations. Then Terecske and Jaszkiser came 
up as a solution, so taking into consideration 
the aspect of time the decision was made for 
the second location. That locator and the 
plant started to work in the beginning of 
1944. The SAS worked perfectly and in 
good conditions it was able to detect targets 
in the range of even 500 kms. By the end of 
the year the „air defence radio measurement 
artillery/ fighter” plant was in working order 
(its device was the FREYA from German 
import) in Dunapentele. Colonel Jaky 
proposed a „fly in „ of the locator and its 
deployment from the 1st of December. 
The signal network of the plant was also 
arranged. According to the decision of the 
General Staff the locator in Dunapentele was 
also used for long-distance recce, its 
„switching on „ was allowed only in 
exceptional situations. For fighter guidance 
the 2 available WURZBURG-Rs were 
deployed in the same district. In December 
the Germans gave the next 2 FREYAs to 
Hungary. 
But by the end of 1943 the plants only in  
Sari and Dunapentele had worked. In 
October Colonel Jaky ordered an 
establishment of a furtherLRB/V plant near 
Jaszkiser. He wanted to deploy there the 
SAS, the second Hungarian search and long-
distance recce locator for fighter guidance. 
The production of the Hungarian 
BORBALA was also in process at 
STANDARD but the production of the 3 
locators stopped with the German 
occupation. But according to the 
experiments the locators performed their 
tasks perfectly, with great mobility, since 
their equipment was mounted on the 36M 
air defence cannon. The radars built into 
fighters and aircraft were only in the phase 
of design or in the beginning of production. 
In 1943 the entire domestic air defence 
observation and warning system got under 
the authority of „Air Defence Forces 
Command”. By the end of the year the air 
defence had - though not all devices were 
deployed - 4 search (two of which were 
domestically produced SAS), 5 
WURZBURG-DORA air defence artillery 
fire delivery (all German products) and 2 
WURZBURG- RIESE fighter guidance 
(also German ) locators. One piece of the 
search locators was planned to be used for 
long-distance recce, 2 for fighter guidance, 1 
for air defence artillery fire delivery. So the 
army had a system of devices that could 
have provided the basis for the 
establishment of the modern air defence. But  
the chance was lost due to the  events of the 
war and partially, of the German occupation. 
On the 23rd of November both General 
Zoltan Harmos and Colonel Jaky asked for 
the extension of the work of the Bay team 
until the 31st of December 1944. In their 
opinion, at least one more year was 
neccessary to continue and end the research, 
trials and planning. As a result, General 
Harmos said the following: „ of the 3 locator 
types we would have our own by 1944”. So 
the industrial capacity is capable to satisfy 
the need for the production of 300 locators. 
In his opinion it was impossible to rely on 
the German import, since they delivered 
only 6 radars so far. Besides, he also 
emphasized that the devices planned and 
produced by the Bay team, such as the 
transmitting valve, the reinforcing valve, 
diode, the low performance vibration valve, 
cathode ray valve were excellent. 
The reason for the extension request was 
that there were still a lot of unsolved 
matters. These were the problems in 
disturbance protection, the friendly aircraft 
detection system and the wave ranged 
devices. He emphasized the unique credits 
of Dr. Bay and since the professor did not 
accept any payment, not even money for his 
expenses, he proposed to give him an award. 
From the 2nd half of 1943 the Germans 
started to plan the deployment of many 
recce and fighter detection locators to 
Hungary, but for their own purposes. The 
Hungarian recommendation for common use 
of these devices was probably not accepted. 
After the German occupation on the 19th 
of March, the Bay team was involved, after 
working on the development of the 
Hungarian locator, in the preparation for the 
mass production of a universal German 
military microwave valve. Colonel Jaky 
Jozsef, the genius organiser, lost his life 
during the air attacks against Hungary. 
The Hungarian civilian and military 
leaders tried to supply the Hungarian 
military with proper equipment according to 
the given circumstances and opportunities. 
This proved to be successful. It was only in 
the middle of the next decade that Hungary 
and its army had the chance to obtain 
excellent equipment like this. 
Conclusion 
It would also be useful in our days if the 
„small states „ paid more attention to this 
system of organisation and equipment so 
effective for security. Even though there is 
little chance for a traditional war in Europe, 
but the events of 9/11 demonstrated that 
there are new dimensions of air threats. 
Hungary and the Hungarian defence 
forces must have the following systems for 
the proper security and defence: 
1. A basic radar system that 
continuously provides the minimally needed 
coverage.  This can be achieved by the 
deployment and usage of 3 high 
performance NATO radars. 
2. A mobile radar system. With its help 
it would be possible to extend the radio 
location area in a given direction, with given 
requirements. 
3. The most critical part of the system 
is the lack of air reconnaissance. The 
Hungarian Defence Forces do not possess 
their own satellite system; there are no 
AWACS, not even „balloon” radar. The 
fulfilment of these necessities is not 
expected in the near future. 
4. The database of the civilian air traffic 
control has been used but the recce of the air 
combat equipment cannot be based on a 
secondary system whose identification 
capability, disturbance defence is highly 
limited from the military point of view, not 
to mention the fixed location (Korishegy, 
Puspokladany, Ferihegy ) 
5. The HDF has the command point and 
the system necessary for the data collection, 
processing and forwarding of the above- 
mentioned elements. Continuous 
modernisation is necessary in this area as 
well. 
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